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Abstract 
The paper refers to CRUTIAL7, CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience, a European project within 
the research area of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, with a specific focus on the 
infrastructures operated by power utilities, widely recognized as fundamental to national and 
international economy, security and quality of life. Such infrastructures faced with the recent market 
deregulations and the multiple interdependencies with other infrastructures are becoming more and 
more vulnerable to various threats, including accidental failures and deliberate sabotage and malicious 
attacks. 
The subject of CRUTIAL research are small scale networked ICT systems used to control and manage 
the electric power grid, in which artifacts controlling the physical process of electricity transportation 
need to be connected with corporate and societal applications performing management and 
maintenance functionality. The peculiarity of such ICT-supported systems is that they are related to the 
power system dynamics and its emergency conditions. 
Specific effort need to be devoted by the Electric Power community and by the Information 
Technology community to influence the technological progress in order to allow commercial intelligent 
electronic devices to be effectively deployed for the protection of citizens against cyber threats to 
electric power management and control systems. A well-founded know-how needs to be built inside the 
industrial power sector to allow all the involved stakeholders to achieve their service objectives without 
compromising the resilience properties of the logical and physical assets that support the electric power 
provision. 
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 Introduction 
The problem of security and dependability, or generically speaking, resilience [1] of Internet-
oriented infrastructure systems, such as web server compounds, is reasonably well 
understood. Although it is not completely mastered (for example, denial of service is still a 
research subject), it is receiving adequate attention. However, such is not the case with the 
problem of resilience of critical utility infrastructures. This problem is not completely 
understood, mainly due to the hybrid composition of these infrastructures. 
The process control of utility infrastructures is based on the SCADA (Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition) systems which yield the operational ability to acquire data, supervise 
and control whatever is the business in question (electricity, water, gas, telecomm). However, 
they also have interconnections to the standard corporate intranets, and hence indirectly to the 
Internet (e.g., remote access via dedicated or public networks). The aforementioned SCADA 
systems were classically not designed to be widely distributed and remotely accessed, let 
alone be open. They grew-up standalone, closed, not having security in mind. 
Widely distributed monitoring, protection and control systems, implementing special 
protection scheme over the power transmission network, are emerging whose architecture is 
based on open communication infrastructures. 
This opening that we observe nowadays is an afterthought in the line of the generic trend of 
any informatics system. Whilst it seems non-controversial that such a status quo brings a 
certain level of threat, namely but not only through interference, we know of no work that has 
tried to equate the problem by defining a model of “modern utilities distributed systems 
architecture”. We believe that evaluation work on such a model will let us learn about activity 
patterns of interdependencies that will reveal the potential for far more damaging fault/failure 
scenarios than those that have been anticipated up to now. Moreover, such a model will be 
highly constructive as well, for it will form a structured framework for: conceiving the right 
balance between prevention and removal of vulnerabilities and attacks, and tolerance of 
remaining potential intrusions and designed-in faults. 
In fact, this hap hazardous evolution led to the inevitable: access to operational networks such 
as remote SCADA maneuvering, ended up entangled with access to corporate intranets and 
public Internet, without there being computational and resilience models that understand 
(represent) this situation and deal with the resulting interference. In consequence, unlike what 
exists in simpler, more homogeneous settings, e.g. classical web-based server infrastructures 
on Internet, it is in most circumstances not possible to devise a dependability and security 
case for these interconnected critical utility infrastructures. 
The damage perspectives that may result from this exposure are overwhelming. They range 
from wrong maneuvering, to malicious actions coming from terminals located outside, 
somewhere in the Internet. The targets of these actions are computer control units, embedded 
components and systems, that is, devices connected to operational hardware (e.g., water 
pumps and filters, electrical power generators and power protections, dam gates, etc.). In the 
electrical power provision these situations have already been experimented by citizens in 
various part of the world. As a single example, among blackouts that occurred in the summer 
of 2003 in several countries, we can remember the North American one, which  is very 
relevant to explain  the project motivations: as highlighted in the analysis report [2], it was the 
failure of various information systems that thwarted the utility workers’ ability to contain the 
blackout before it cascaded out of control. A type of failure that is characteristic of 
interdependent critical infrastructures happened then, that is an escalating failure8, a type of 
failure that we shall address in this project. 
                                                
8 “An escalating failure occurs when an existing disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an independent 
disruption of a second infrastructure, generally in the form of increasing the severity or the time for recovery 
or restoration of the second failure”. 
 The main challenge of the project is to make power control resilient in spite of threats to their 
information and communication infrastructures. Considering the crucial role of control 
systems in governing the quality and the stability of the electric power service, it is considered 
of great importance for the utilities operating the infrastructures to dispose of tools for 
analyzing threat impacts and of technologies for avoiding, or limiting, most serious 
consequences. 
The paper presents the basic research challenges that the CRUTIAL consortium has 
identified, an overview on the state of the art about the major topics involved, and the work 
plan that CRUTIAL intends to develop during the project course, based on the modeling and 
architectural approaches which represent the background of the project team. 
 
Research challenges and objectives 
The project focuses on the electrical power infrastructure and the information infrastructures, 
by considering different topology realms and different kinds of risks: distinguishing the 
backbone from the specific information networks and from the infrastructures dedicated to the 
control and monitoring of the electric power infrastructure, as they usually have different 
levels of protection; distinguishing faults of different kinds and severities, such as electric 
power outages and cyber attacks. 
The main objective of the project is the investigation of models and architectures that cope 
with the scenario of openness, heterogeneity and evolvability endured by electrical utilities 
infrastructures, in the present and near future. The approach taken should support the analysis 
and management of interdependencies and of the resulting overall operational risk. 
Firstly, the project aims to develop comprehensive modeling approaches, supported by 
measurement based experiments, to analyze critical scenarios in which internal or external 
faults in a segment of the information infrastructure provoke a serious impact on the 
controlled electric power infrastructure, in order to understand and master such 
interdependencies to avoid escalating and cascading failures that result in outages and 
blackouts. Effort will be focused on the modeling and analysis of interdependencies, 
especially the various types of failures that can occur in the presence of accidental and 
malicious faults affecting the information and electric power infrastructures: physical 
(hardware) faults of various temporal characteristics from transient to permanent; yet 
undiscovered design faults in software (“bugs”) and in hardware (“errata”); interaction faults 
due to mistakes of human operators or maintainers; malicious human-caused faults, i.e. denial 
or unauthorized alteration of services by software attacks or physical sabotage.  
Given the complexity of the analysis task, a difficulty will be to find the right abstractions of 
the models. The aim is therefore to produce, from conceptual analysis, generic models that 
can be refined and instantiated. The abstractions will be substantiated by examples taken from 
the electric application domain. Another expected difficulty is the heterogeneity of the 
models, given the very different nature of the various components under study. 
Secondly, the project will investigate distributed architectures dedicated to the control and 
management of the power grid, in the perspective of improving the capability of analyzing 
critical scenarios and designing dependable interconnected power control systems. The 
architectures under study will address requirements coming from the needs of flexible electric 
power services, characterized by dispersed energy resources, on-demand control and inputs 
from the market.  
In consequence, our objective is to devise new architectural configurations that address the 
increase in operational risk derived from the analysis made above. This risk derives not only 
from accidental faults or wrong maneuvers, but also, and very importantly, from both the 
degree of vulnerability and the level of threat to which the infrastructures and services are 
subjected. The objective of preventing escalating failures on the various information 
infrastructures (monitoring, control, management) that interact on a decentralized power grid 
 can only be met by the combined use of fault prevention and tolerance, and by the 
simultaneous addressing of accidental and malicious faults, also called intrusion-tolerance, 
enhanced by the provision of on-line monitoring support to evaluate possible alternative 
architectural configurations in uncertain and evolving scenarios.  
 
Background 
This section gives an overview of international initiatives and working groups related to the 
topic of our project, as well as related work on dependability and security modeling and on 
resilient distributed real-time architectures. 
 
International initiatives and working groups 
There is a consensus in the literature on critical infrastructures that interdependency analyses 
and models constitute a necessary step [3]. The International CIIP Handbook 2004 [4] is a 
comprehensive collection of information about the various initiatives undertaken by the 
different countries on the theme of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), 
mainly at governmental level. The CIIP Handbook underlies the need of developing 
methodologies for analyzing interdependencies and guiding the protection of critical 
information infrastructures. In Italy, the Working Group on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection released a document [5] in October 2003 describing many elements 
of the Italian infrastructures, emphasizing their interdependencies, suggesting CIIP policy 
strategies and research challenges. 
In the Unites States many research initiatives and activities related to the protection of critical 
infrastructures have been undertaken from the nineties. NERC has organized a Cyber Security 
Urgent Action, resulting in some guidelines, compliance audits, and activities such as 
workshops for awareness raising. In 1998 the USA’s Department of Energy assigned to 
NERC the role of reference point for cyber security for the electric power sector. The CIPC 
(Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee) was created to develop and maintain 
capabilities to respond to security threats and incidents, and support the production of 
standards and guidelines. Also in the US, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) started 
the “Infrastructure Security Initiative” addressing power system security at both electrical and 
cyber levels. The Department of Energy (DOE) published the “21 Steps to Improve Cyber 
Security of SCADA Networks”, whilst the Sandia National Laboratories developed a research 
program on SCADA electronic security [6]. 
In Europe the need of setting up research programs on critical infrastructures has been 
recognized from several years. However a limited number of European Projects has addressed 
the emerging problems of digitalized critical infrastructures. The ACIP (Analysis & 
Assessment for Critical Infrastructure Protection) project produced a roadmap about R&D 
activities to be performed on the topic. A roadmap on research activity in the area of 
information system dependability has been produced by the AMSD accompanying measure 
(A Dependability Roadmap for the Information Society in Europe). The FP5-IST research 
project SAFEGUARD (Intelligent Agents Organization to Enhance Dependability and 
Survivability of Large Complex Critical Infrastructure) proposed an agent-based architecture 
for supporting the supervision and decision support systems in critical infrastructural 
domains. 
From the standardization side, there are several working groups devoted to the application of 
Information Technology in Electric Power Systems. A paper [7] providing a survey on 
ongoing activities has been published by the Cigré Joint Working Group D2/B3/C2-01 
“Security for Information Systems and Intranets in Electric Power Systems”.  
The American Gas Association (AGA) are active in the development of cryptographic 
standards for SCADA communication [8]. 
The Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society (ISA) published two reference reports 
[9] on Electronic Security in Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment. 
 The Computer Security Resource Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), including the Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF), published 
relevant papers on the topic ([10], [11], [12]). 
We can observe that any document by such standard committees emphasizes the importance 
of Cyber Risk Assessment of power control systems and a first methodological approach has 
been presented in a recent paper of the Cigrè Group [13]. 
Also a number of institutional/research organization are performing activities which provide 
information suitable to the identification of robust architectural patterns for industrial control 
systems. 
The National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre – NISCC in London coordinates a 
forum on SCADA and Control Systems Information Exchange. They also are going to 
establish the CERT-UK for SCADA and they are developing the SCADA Incident Database. 
The British Columbia Institute of Technology – BCIT is developing a platform for testing 
SCADA vulnerability. They perform vulnerability analysis of SCADA protocols, they 
investigate on the use of firewall in SCADA systems and are developing the Industrial 
Security Incident Database.  
The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory - INEEL/SNL are developing 
the SCADA National Test Bed, which is specifically dedicated to testing control systems of a 
wide area electric power grid.  
A test bed for the simulation of attack scenarios to power control and management systems 
has been set up at CESI Laboratory [14]. 
Dependability and security modeling 
A large body of research exist on the dependability analysis and evaluation of computer based 
infrastructures, in particular with respect to accidental threats, considering two main 
complementary approaches: i) analytical modeling and ii) measurement-based assessment.  
Analytical modeling has been proven to be a cost effective and useful technique to support 
architectural design decisions, as a model can play the double role of a specification of the 
design, as well as the basis for a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the design itself.  
Several model-based evaluation techniques are currently available, including combinatorial 
techniques (reliability block diagrams, fault trees, network graph analysis, Bayesian networks) 
or state space analysis (Markov chains, stochastic Petri nets and their extensions). State-based 
models are commonly used, as they are able to capture various functional and stochastic 
dependencies among components and allow the evaluation of various measures related to 
dependability and performance. However, the major difficulty with such models is related to 
the model largeness and state explosion problem. Significant progress has been obtained 
during the last twenty years, by CRUTIAL partners and elsewhere, for addressing such 
problem at the model construction and model solution levels. The proposed techniques 
include the use of hierarchical approaches, composition rules, parametric modelling, state 
truncation, state aggregation, as well as high-level specification formalisms and automated 
generation methods, based for example on SPNs (Stochastic Petri Nets) and their extensions, 
or on semi-formal specification languages like UML diagrams.  
As regards malicious threats, traditional security evaluation approaches are mainly based on 
qualitative analysis and evaluation criteria. While these criteria provide useful guidelines 
during the design, it is widely recognized that they are insufficient to assess the impact of 
attacks on security during the operation phase. To fill this gap, new approaches have been 
proposed recently for the quantitative evaluation of security based on probabilistic modelling 
approaches [15]. 
Existing results on dependability and security modeling and evaluation have mainly addressed 
individual infrastructures without tackling the problem of interdependencies between 
infrastructures. However, to truly understand and analyze the operational characteristics of 
these infrastructures, it is necessary to model such interdependencies and analyze their impact 
 with respect to the occurrence of critical outages. The need for such modeling and assessment 
studies has been highlighted in the conclusions of the RamI (R&D challenges for Resilience 
in Ambient Intelligence”) Workshop organized by the European commission in March 2004. 
Also, it has been pointed out in the recommendations of the roadmap for European R&D on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, produced by the ACIP (Analysis & Assessment for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection) project. 
It is only recently that the problem of interdependencies modeling has been addressed by the 
research community. To the best of our knowledge there are currently no available significant 
results tackling this problem. The papers published so far on this topic mainly include 
definitions of the multiple dimensions of interdependencies [3], or discuss potential 
approaches and preliminary models that are aimed at describing and analyzing the impact of 
interdependencies (see [16] and references within [17],[18]).  
 
Resilient distributed real-time architectures 
There is a reasonable body of research on distributed computing architectures, methodologies 
and algorithms, both in the fields of dependability and fault tolerance, and in security and 
information assurance. These are commonly used in a wide spectrum of situations: 
information infrastructures; commercial web-based sites; embedded systems. Their operation 
has always been a concern, namely presently, due to the use of COTS, compressed design 
cycles, openness. Whilst they have taken separate paths until recently, the problems to be 
solved are of similar nature: keeping systems working correctly, despite the occurrence of 
mishaps, which we could commonly call faults (accidental or malicious); ensure that, when 
systems do fail (again, on account of accidental or malicious faults), they do so in a non 
harmful/catastrophic way. In classical dependability, and mainly in distributed settings, fault 
tolerance has been the workhorse of the many solutions published over the years. Classical 
security-related work has on the other hand privileged, with few exceptions, intrusion 
prevention, or intrusion detection without systematic forms of processing the intrusion 
symptoms. 
A new approach has slowly emerged during the past decade, and gained impressive 
momentum recently: intrusion tolerance. That is, the notion of -- handling/react, counteract, 
recover, mask -- a wide set of faults encompassing intentional and malicious faults (we may 
collectively call them intrusions), which may lead to failure of the system security properties 
if nothing is done to counter their effect on the system state. In short, instead of trying to 
prevent every single intrusion, these are allowed, but tolerated: the system has the means to 
trigger mechanisms that prevent the intrusion from generating a system failure. In fact, the 
term “intrusion tolerance” was used for the first time more than 20 years ago, and a sequel of 
that work lead to a specific system developed in the DELTA-4 project [19]. In the following 
years, a number of isolated works, mainly on protocols, took place that can be put under the 
IT umbrella [20],[21],[22], but only recently did the area develop significantly, with two main 
projects OASIS and MAFTIA [23], doing structured work on concepts, mechanisms and 
architectures. These projects, however, mainly addressed the issue of intrusion tolerance on 
Internet-oriented infrastructures type of systems. Some progress has been obtained recently by 
CRUTIAL partners in protocols resilient to malicious faults [24] and on architecting and 
programming with trusted components [25]. In this project, we intend to make important 
advances on how to tolerate intrusions on critical utility infrastructures. 
 
CRUTIAL work plan 
The research that will developed in CRUTIAL address the objective to improve the resilience 
of the power grid by deploying suited information and communication infrastructures. Two 
main research directions will be investigated to fulfill this objective. The first research line 
focuses on the development of a model-based methodology for the dependability and security 
analysis of the power grid information infrastructures. A second line of research is related to 
 the design of control system architectures and protection mechanisms for electric power 
systems. Both the (modeling and architectural) project activities are driven by the 
identification of some reference control system scenarios and examples of various types of 
interdependencies based on the analysis of the existing and ongoing evolutions of the target 
architectures. 
The activities that will be carried out can be summarized as follows: 
a) identification and description of reference control system scenarios;  
b) development of comprehensive modeling approaches for understanding and mastering the 
various interdependencies;  
c) development of test beds integrating the electric power system and the information 
infrastructure to support the analysis and validation of control system and 
interdependencies scenarios;  
d) investigation of fault-tolerant architectural configurations and protection mechanisms to 
enhance the resilience of target infrastructure;  
e) provision of qualitative and quantitative support for the identification, analysis and 
evaluation of the scenarios identified. 
The following subsections summarize these activities and the research directions that will be 
explored.   
 
Identification and Description of Control System Scenarios 
A control system scenario defines a reference structure of i) the power grid, ii) the monitoring 
& control network, with Intelligent Electronic Devices at different levels of the power system 
(Control Center level, Station level, Bay level, Process level), iii) the management 
information networks and their functional relationships with the process network, iv) and the 
different threats that may threaten the operation of the power system services. 
Control system scenarios are derived from ongoing evolutions of existing control systems, 
such as the increasing impact of dispersed electricity generation (renewable energy sources, -
e.g. photovoltaic and wind energy- that are connected on different places to the electricity 
distribution network). If sufficient generation (and storage) facilities are available in a part of 
the electrical grid, such part can become an energy island (or microgrid) which functions 
independently from the major grid (e.g. during blackout). Different evolution aspects are 
taken into account in the scenario identification phase. 
A first set of scenarios will be derived from the control of distributed generation systems and 
microgrids. Such control systems form a so-called Autonomous Electricity Network (AEN), 
i.e. a group of distributed generators, intelligent loads and storage devices, capable of 
cooperation and control in a distributed manner, i.e., without central controller, and this based 
on standard components and public communication networks. External information, such as 
the instantaneous electricity price from real-time market place, can be incorporated into the 
control strategies in order to optimize economic control objectives. Hence, this information 
infrastructure is used for tertiary control, based on communication among the different 
entities without central coordination. It comes on top of the primary control of voltage and 
frequency (which is local i.e. without communication) and secondary control (which is 
centralized and used for e.g. dispatching). As such reliability of these electricity networks is 
improved, also when sub-networks of the electricity network are separated from the main 
network. In islanding mode, several issues need to be solved regarding protection and control 
(e.g. the selectivity of the protection needs to react on different threshold), which requires 
appropriate communication and control. The ICT infrastructure and several control algorithms 
are also required when re-synchronizing the microgrid to the main grid after islanding. 
A second evolutionary aspect for control scenarios is related to new Power Management 
Systems which integrate management information networks with process control networks. 
Security and dependability issues become a major concern in this situation. This also includes 
the consideration of the configuration capabilities required to substation control systems by 
the new organization of the power market. These setups address information infrastructures in 
 which involved stakeholders access to the power management system for many different 
purposes, and some of them require to modify the power network asset through the on-line 
reconfiguration of the field equipment and their control apparatus. 
 
Interdependencies modelling 
The objective is to develop a comprehensive modeling framework aimed at fulfilling the 
following goals: i) characterize and analyze the interdependencies between the information 
infrastructure and the controlled power infrastructure, especially the various types of failures 
that might occur in the presence of accidental and malicious faults; and ii) assess their impact 
on the resilience of these infrastructures with respect to the occurrence of critical outages and 
perform sensitivity analyses to support design decisions. 
Two complementary analysis and modeling methods will be investigated: a) qualitative 
analysis methods based on hazard identification and risk modeling techniques, aiming at the 
identification of failure scenarios, the analysis of their impact and their ranking according to 
severity and criticality criteria; b) quantitative evaluation methods based on stochastic 
processes (using e.g., Markov chains or stochastic Petri nets), aiming at quantifying the 
impact of failure and recovery scenarios on the behavior of the infrastructures and the 
dependability and trustworthiness of the delivered service. 
The modeling framework investigated in CRUTIAL is aimed at taking into account multiple 
dimensions of interdependencies [3]: a) the types of interdependencies (physical, cyber, 
geographic, logical), b) the coupling and response behavior (loose or tight, inflexible or 
adaptive), c) the various classes of faults that can occur, and d) the different time scales, and 
the infrastructure characteristics (organizational, operational, temporal, spatial). Particular 
focus will be put on the study of the types of failures that are characteristic of interdependent 
critical infrastructures: Cascading failures, Escalating failures and Common cause failures.  
Although the modeling of such failures has received increasing interest in the last years9 after 
the large blackouts of electric power transmission systems in 1996 and 2003, this problem is 
still open and further developments are needed, in particular with respect to the modeling of 
escalating failures. The analysis of such types of failures requires the use of models that are 
able to describe stochastic dependencies and to take into account non-stationary phenomena 
that result in particular from the combined impact of component failures and performance 
degradations due to overloads.  
Accounting for all such aspects raises a number of challenging issues that need to be 
addressed and require appropriate methodologies to overcome them. A discussion of some of 
these challenges and of the research directions that will be explored in the project is given in 
the following. 
A major difficulty lies in the complexity of the modeled infrastructures in terms of largeness, 
multiplicity of interactions and types of interdependencies involved. To address this problem, 
a number of abstractions and appropriate approaches for composition of models will be 
necessary. The aim is therefore to produce, from conceptual analyses, generic models that can 
be refined, instantiated and composed according to hierarchical modeling approaches. 
Generalization, adaptation and extension of our previous approaches (see [26],[27],[28], [29], 
[30]) will be necessary to address: i) the specific challenges and characteristics inherent to the 
combined modeling of information and power distribution infrastructures; ii) the combination 
of different formalisms to describe the various component of a system and their 
dependencies); iii) extension of existing formalisms to deal with peculiar features raising from 
our application context. 
Another point is on-line evaluation (as opposed to traditional off-line evaluation), which 
would be desirable in a number of circumstances, in particular to support the efficient 
                                                
9  I. Dobson, B.A. Carreras, V. Lynch, D.E. Newman, “Complex Systems analysis of series of blackouts: 
cascading failure, criticality, and self-organization”, Bulk Power System and Control, Aug. 2004, Cortina 
d’Ampezzo, Italy. 
 selection of adaptive reconfiguration strategies. Of course, although appealing, the online 
solution shows a number of challenging problems requiring substantial investigations (e.g., 
dynamic instanciation of models, compositional rules, efficient model solution). 
An additional relevant issue that needs to be carefully addressed in the modeling concerns the 
well known stiffness problem, or system parameters that are only partially defined. Such a 
problem can be alleviated by the use of aggregation and approximation techniques. Also, we 
need to address the problem of modeling interdependencies in a context characterized by 
different operation phases and regimes with different configurations and behaviors. Such 
changes might have a significant impact on the parameters describing the occurrence of 
failures and their propagation. We will investigate the use of stochastic models for multi-
phased systems to address this problem [32]. 
Finally, a difficult issue concerns the evaluation of the impact of malicious faults. 
Traditionally, only accidental faults in software and hardware components have been taken 
into account in the evaluation of quantitative dependability measures, while the evaluation of 
security has been mainly based on qualitative evaluation criteria [33]. However, quantitative 
criteria are widely recognized to be insufficient for analyzing and assessing the impact of 
malicious attacks and vulnerabilities on the security of systems in operation, or to support the 
design of intrusion-tolerant systems, and quantitative evaluation based on probabilistic 
modeling is a promising research direction aimed at filling this gap. Some pioneering work 
has been achieved by some of the CRUTIAL partners towards this objective [34]. However, 
to be applicable to the context of interdependent information and power distribution systems, 
generalization and extensions have to be developed. The ultimate objective that will be 
pursued during the project on this topic will be the definition of a comprehensive framework 
for the modeling and evaluation of resilience taking into account malicious faults as well as 
accidental faults. 
 
Resilient architectures and protection mechanisms 
CRUTIAL will study the information infrastructures used in electric power systems, in order 
to derive common denominators: exposure, threat, vulnerability, unsafety, etc. Thus it will 
define a reference architecture that takes into account the needs defined by this operation 
(e.g., that a certain level of exposure is unavoidable). Considering the testbed described above 
we foresee at least three interconnection realms with different levels of threat, degrees of 
vulnerability, level of criticality w.r.t. acceptable operational risk: operational 
SCADA/embedded networks; corporate intranets; Internet/PSTN access. 
WP4 will investigate on 
• architectural configurations that induce prevention of the more severe interaction faults, 
and attack and vulnerability combinations. The challenge here, furthering recent research 
achievements on fault and intrusion tolerant (FIT) architecturing [23], lies exactly with 
the (unavoidable) entanglement of the information flows of the three above-mentioned 
realms; 
• middleware devices that achieve tolerance of the remaining faults/intrusions (architectural 
blocks, protocols). We plan to study combinations of recent promising techniques for 
building protocols that address the different levels of criticality in the foreseen 
architecture, such as randomization or wormholes; 
• sophisticated system monitoring mechanisms that go beyond mere intrusion detection but 
instead achieve what might be called trustworthiness monitoring, where the general level 
of resilience of the system is assessed during its operation, both from the perspective of 
attacks, vulnerabilities, and general faults. 
The architectural configurations developed in the project will have to strike a right balance 
between the prevention and removal of the more severe interaction faults and vulnerability-
attack combinations, and the tolerance of the remaining potential faults and intrusions. The 
challenge here, furthering recent research achievements on fault and intrusion tolerant 
architecturing, lies exactly with the (unavoidable) entanglement of the information flows of 
the various above-mentioned infrastructures. 
 The findings of WP4 investigations will be validated both through proof-of-concept 
prototypes of the above-mentioned functionality, and real-life testbed experiments, and by 
building a resilience case in the new architectural scene, and compare it against the starting 
scenarios studied in the beginning. They will be formally validated also, by several means that 
include modeling, and experimental validation.  
 
Testbed and experimental evaluation 
Two testbed will be developed which integrate the electric power system and the information 
infrastructure. This will allow the elaboration of new control scenarios in order to better 
identify them, to allow for the deployment of architectural patterns, and, to complement the 
modeling to analyze interdependencies and to identify critical failure modes. These testbed 
platforms will be based on power electronic converters and Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs) – such as bay level controllers and power station computers – that are interconnected 
via off-the-shelf communication protocols (TCP/IP or UDP/IP).  
It is clear that in all control scenarios identified, ICT and electric power infrastructures are 
tightly coupled: a suited architecture needs to be developed and the interdependencies 
analyzed. The identified scenarios will drive the development of the analysis methodology 
and of the architectural design. The testbed experiments will instantiate the designed ideas 
onto innovative infrastructures in which the power process control is connected to the power 
business management.  
The testbed will consist of two platforms; as illustrated below, both platforms are required, 
because they are complementary to each other. 
A first testbed consists of several power electronic converters, which are interconnected via 
off-the-shelf communication protocols (TCP/IP). It is based on the Herakles platform [35], 
developed at K.U.Leuven. Each converter can be used to emulate generators or loads in an 
energy island. The Herakles platform allows different control ideas (voltage/frequency/current 
control, power quality control, etc.) to be modeled in a high level programming tool such as 
Matlab, after which it can be swiftly prototyped on a 4-quadrant power electronic converter, 
whereby the control algorithms are downloaded on high performance signal processing 
hardware (DSP + FPGA) which manages the power electronics. This DSP is connected to a 
PC which allows communication with other intelligent components. 
As these Herakles platforms are connected to PC’s, they can be interconnected via TCP/IP 
modules in order to extend the control scope from local towards hierarchical and 
decentralized control algorithms.  
By the project-start, about 3 of these Herakles elements are available, on which mainly local 
control algorithms are being executed. During the CRUTIAL project, this platform will be 
further developed to be able to execute different hierarchical and distributed control 
algorithms. For this, work is required on the hardware and software of the platform, as well as 
on the middleware modules to interconnect them into a network – as such creating an 
information infrastructure.  
Because of the distributed approach, this platform will be mainly used in the context the so-
called ‘new’ control scenarios. It will be used to evaluate the aspects of interdependencies 
between the information infrastructure and the electric power system, and to identify the 
robustness of the control algorithms to disturbances, and to provide feedback to the modeling 
and architectural parts based on the experiments. 
A second testbed is based on a platform which is currently under development at CESI labs 
for supporting the simulation of attack scenarios. The platform consists of an Ethernet based 
communication infrastructure interconnecting a power substation control network, a 
substation supervision network and a control centre network through protocols based on 
standard communication stacks (e.g. UDP/IP). The power substation control network is 
modular and composed by a heterogeneous set of real time targets performing process data 
elaboration. The software architecture of the station automation application is based on an 
automation software engineering environment developed at CESI that supports automata-
 based specification, automatic code generation and distributed execution. The substation 
supervision network consists of standard elaboration units which provide data base, 
administration and web services supporting monitoring and maintenance functions, whilst the 
control center implements remote supervision and control functions, as well as maintenance. 
This second set-up is complementary to the first platform because it builds on environments 
that are used in industrial automation (SCADA-based). It is also well suited to evaluate the 
effects of fault propagation of e.g. malicious faults, because these SCADA networks can be 
integrated into corporate control and administrative networks. 
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